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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Appellate Division, Second Department, added an amendment to the
Trial and Special Term Rules of the Supreme Court of Kings
County,34 which provides for a method of arbitrating certain matters
in the process of litigation. It is suggested that this is a very prac-
tical amendment and one which will, if availed of, as its merit war-
rants, eliminate considerable time, effort and expense to litigants,
lawyers and courts alike. It remains for the members of the bar to
carry the spirit and purpose of such rules and of arbitration in
general into practical effect.
PHILIP V. MANNING, JR.
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS BASED ON FRAUDULENT PROMISES.
Promises made with intent not to perform have been frequently
treated by the courts as actual fraud. A court of equity will not,
under the guise of a constructive trust, enforce a mere oral promise,
void under the statute of frauds. On the other hand, equity will not
permit the statute to be made a cloak for fraud, and if one person has
obtained title to property of another, or in which another has an
interest, by means of an intentionally false and fraudulent verbal
promise to hold or dispose of it for a particular purpose, equity will
not permit him to retain the property and repudiate the promise.1 If
we consider a case where A, having an equity of redemption in land,
enters into an oral agreement with B, the mortgagee, that A will not
attend the foreclosure sale, but that B will attend and bid in the
property and hold it for A's benefit, our problem is whether the
courts will enforce A's rights by way of a constructive trust, after B
so obtains the property and pleads the statute of frauds as a bar to
the enforcement of the oral agreement.
'Amendment to Trial and Special Term Rules, Supreme Court, Kings
County, adding new subdivision "f" to Rule 14, in effect April 1, 1932:
"(f) The Justice assigned to Special Term, Part 2, shall on each
Monday, Wednesday and Friday, between 11 A. M. and 1 P. M., hear
such matters as may be brought before him under the provisions of this
subdivision, which matters shall be known as 'Informal Motions.' In any
action or proceeding in the second Judicial District in which the attorneys
for all parties who have appeared shall appear voluntarily before such
Justice for the purpose of obtaining a ruling or a decision, such Justice
sitting as the court shall hear the parties informally, without presentation
of affidavits, motion papers or proof, and make a ruling or decision
thereupon, which, if desired by either party, may be embodied in a court
order or judgment to be signed and entered."
'Ryan v. Dox, 25 Barb. (N. Y.) 440, rev'd, 34 N. Y. 307 (1866) ; Fletcher
v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 114 Misc. 409, 187 N. Y. Supp. 429 (1921), aff'd,
197 App. Div. 484, 189 N. Y. Supp. 453 (1st Dept. 1921) ; Henschel v. Mamero,
120 Ill. 660, 12 N. E. 203 (1887); Gregory v. Bowlsby, 88 N. W. (Iowa) 822
(1902).
NOTES AND COMMENT
We have been urfable to find a New York case exactly in point
with the problem under consideration. Lathrop v. Hoyt 2 was a case
in which relief was denied to the plaintiff who sued on the theory of a
resulting trust, the court holding that the agreement to reconvey was
void as being within the statute of frauds, and that there was no trust
which could be enforced. It should be noted, however, that in that
case there was no promise on the part of the owner to refrain from
attending the sale, and in that respect it is distinguishable from the
case under consideration.
One of the foremost writers 3 on the law of trusts maintains
that a trust results from the acts and not from the agreements of the
parties, or rather from the acts accompanied by the agreements, but
that no trust can be set up by mere parol agreements; or, as has been
said, no trust results merely from the breach of a parol contract; as,
for example, if one agrees to purchase lands and give another an
interest in them, and pays his own money on the sale and takes title
in his own name, no trust will result. Also, if a party makes no pay-
ment and none is made for his account, either actually or construc-
tively, he cannot claim a resulting trust.4  Parol proof cannot be
received to establish a resulting trust in lands purchased by an agent
with his own funds, no money of the principal being used for the
payment, as the relation of principal and agent depends upon the
agreement existing between the parties, and the trust in such a case
must arise from the agreement, and not from the transaction, and
where a trust is to arise from an agreement, it is within the statute of
frauds, and must be in writingY
While it is true that parol agreements relating to real property
are no more valid in equity than in law, yet courts of equity have
general jurisdiction to relieve against fraud, and where a parol agree-
ment relating to lands has been so far performed by one party that
he would be defrauded unless the agreement is performed by the
other, the court will grant relief against this imminent fraud and will
enforce the agreement. It is the fraud and not the parol agreement
which lies at the foundation of the jurisdiction in such a case.
Of course, where there is a mere oral promise, without previous
interest in the subject on the part of the promisee, equity will not raise
'7 Barb. 59 (N. Y. 1849).
' 1 PERRY, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (7th ed. 1929) §134.
"Lathrop v. Hoyt, supra note 2; Cotton v. Wood, 25 Iowa 43 (1868);
Bourke v. Callanan, 160 Mass. 195, 35 N. E. 460 (1893); Byers & Co. v.
McEniry, 117 Iowa 499, 91 N. W. 797 (1902) (where a debtor conveyed to one
of his creditors upon the latter's verbal agreement to apply the surplus to the
claims of other creditors); Monson v. Hutchin, 194 Ill. 431, 62 N. E.
788 (1902).
'Lathrop v. Hoyt, ibid.; Pennock v. Clough, 16 Vt. 500 (1844)
Taliaferro v. Taliaferro, 6 Ala. 406 (1844); Arnold v. Cord, 16 Ind. 177
(1861); Kennedy v. Keating, 34 Mo. 25 (1863); Minot v. Mitchell, 30 Ind.
228 (1868); Pearson v. East, 36 Ind. 27 (1871) ; Burden v. Sheridan, 36 Iowa
125 (1872); Nestal v. Schmid, 29 N. J. Eq. 458 (1878).
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a constructive trust as a remedy for the breach of such a promise.
In a case 6 illustrative of this principle, we find a verbal agreement
entered into between the plaintiff and defendant by which the latter
agreed to bid for the property in his own name and to enter into a
contract for the purchase of said property and pay from his own
funds the necessary amount for that purpose, for the joint benefit of
both. The plaintiff was to reimburse one-half of the money so paid.
The deed was to be taken in the name of both. The court held that
the defendant having bid in the land in his own name and taken a
contract thereof, but having refused to convey one-half to the plain-
tiff, no action would lie to compel the execution of the agreement.
While it is true that in that case the plaintiff relied upon the agree-
ment, so far that he did not himself bid or make arrangements with
other parties for bidding, it is to be noted that he had no previous
interest in the subject. Furthermore, part performance of a parol
agreement void by the statute of frauds must be substantial to take
such agreement out of the operation of the statute.
In Wheeler v. Reynolds,7 after an exhaustive review of all the
cases in point up to that time, the court refused to grant to an owner
specific performance of an oral agreement by a mortgagee who,
according to arrangement, was to bid in the premises at a foreclosure
sale, and then sell or hold them for opportune sale, and when sold,
was to deduct the amount of his mortgage debt and pay the owner the
balance. The mortgagee's claim was shown to be about what the land
was then worth. He took possession of the premises and paid the
taxes, etc., for nine years. When this action was commenced, the
land had greatly increased in value.
We think the decision in the Wheeler case does not trench upon
the rule. From its facts we find that the owner had become insolvent
and the mortgage was past due and unpaid; that he did not attend
the sale, but there was no proof that he omitted to attend or to
procure others to attend in reliance upon the agreement, or that, save
for the agreement, he or someone in his behalf could or would have
bid in the property. Certainly the alleged agreement could not be
held enforceable on the ground of part performance, when there was
none. Furthermore, there was no allegation or proof of fraud in the
agreement or sale which would warrant a court of equity in grant-
ing relief.
Prior to the decision in the Wheeler case, the court had occasion
to review a case 8 in which this very question was raised. There the
plaintiffs, owners of the land, procured the defendant, a friend, to
bid in the property under a parol agreement that he would attend the
sale and bid in the land for their benefit and advantage, and take the
deed as his security for the amount paid by him, they agreeing that
6 Levy v. Brush, 31 Super. Ct. 653 (N. Y. 1869), rev'd, 45 N. Y. 589 (1871).
7 66 N. Y. 227 (1876).
'Ryan v. Dox, nupra note 1.
NOTES AND COMMENT
they would not find any other person to attend the sale and bid for
them. Plaintiffs relied on the agreement and made no other effort to
procure the money or the assistance of friends to save or buy in the
land. Plaintiffs continued in the possession of the land after the sale
for six years, and during all that time had the use of the land with
the knowledge and consent of the defendant, paid the taxes and
periodic charges pertaining to the encumbrances thereon. The court
held that the acts of part performance were clearly referable to the
agreement, and were done in reliance thereon, and in partial execution
thereof, and the equity rule of part performance was fully satisfied.
Whenever the condition or position of one of the parties to a
transaction is such that the other may have acquired an unfair
advantage more easily than in ordinary cases, a court of equity will
investigate the whole matter with scrupulous care and readily pre-
sume fraud, unless the absence of fraud is clearly proved. So, if
confidential agents or other fiduciaries acquire property which they
have orally agreed to purchase for persons already owning some
interest either in the land itself or in its purchase money, and then
seek to avail themselves of the statute of frauds as an escape from
performing their agreements, equity will not be slow to frown. It
will not permit the statute to be thus used as an instrument of fraud.
And, in favor of such an interested party, it will raise a constructive
trust in the land so bought. As very well stated by Professor
Reeves,9
"** * Thus, if a person buy realty under an oral agree-
ment to convey all or part of it to one who already has an
interest therein, such as a mortgagor whose land is being sold
on foreclosure, or a part owner of property sold for partition,
equity will hold the purchaser a trustee for him who has such
interest. * * * But beyond this, equity adheres to the statute
of frauds, and where the contracting parties are strangers, will
not enforce an oral agreement to convey realty to one who has
no existing interest in it at the time of its purchase by the
other party, and who has done no act of part performance
and has parted with nothing of value pursuant to his contract
with the purchaser."
It is submitted that where one vested with interest in land,
relying upon the verbal promise of another that he will purchase it
at a judicial sale for the benefit of the former who agrees to take no
other steps to protect his own interest, carries out this agreement on
his part and allows the promisor to acquire the land at such sale, a
subsequent denial of the promise and a refusal to carry it into execu-
tion is such a fraud as will convert the purchaser into a trustee
I REEVEs, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (1909) §395.
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ex maleficio; 10 and especially is this true where, the agreement being
made known at the sale, there is no competition and the land is
obtained at a low price." But an oral agreement by a purchaser at
a judicial sale to take the deed in his own name and convey to another
cannot be enforced against the purchaser as a trustee ex maleficio to
prevent the perpetration of a fraud, where neither party had any
interest in the property, or where no money was advanced to the
purchaser or anything else done in partial performance of the
agreement.
The respective claims of mortgagor and mortgagee in courts of
common law and of equity afford a notable instance of the rise of a
trust through the mere existence of the relationship. But the relation-
ship is not so far analogous to that between a trustee and cestui que
trust as to preclude the mortgagee's purchasing at the foreclosure
sale. The mortgagee is under no obligation to protect the equity of
redemption of the mortgagor. He may deal with the mortgagor
himself in respect to the mortgaged estate, subject only to the qualifi-
cation that the courts will look upon their transactions with jealousy
and set aside a purchase made by the mortgagee, when by the influ-
ence of his position or by constructive fraud, he has gained an
unconscionable advantage, and has purchased the equity of redemp-
tion for a less price than others would have given.
12
It is our opinion, in the problem under review, that the courts
should enforce the rights of the owner of the equity of redemption
by way of a constructive trust, as the owner has performed his part
of the oral agreement out of which the trust arises, and it would work
a fraud to permit the mortgagee to escape under cover of the statute.
While we agree that the mere breach of an oral agreement is not in
general enough to take a case out of the statute, we have here a real
interest in the subject matter prior to the arrangement, and the
owner, relying upon the verbal promise of the mortgagee to buy in
the property for the benefit of the former, was induced to refrain
from taking other measures to protect his interest.
HELEN L. BROTMAN.
Peppard Realty Co., Inc. v. Emdon, 241 N. Y. 588, 150 N. E. 566 (1925)
(holding that where defendant was employed orally to procure money to enable
plaintiff to bid in his property at foreclosure sale, and property was bid in by
another acting for defendant, who transferred bid to defendant, defendant
took title as trustee for plaintiff and could not set up statute of frauds to
defraud plaintiff). Myers v. Grey, 122 N. Y. Supp. 1079, aff'd, 146 App.
Div. 923, 131 N. Y. Supp. 1130 (2d Dept. 1911) (holding that an agreement to
purchase at a mortgage foreclosure sale and hold the property for the mort-
gagor's benefit until advances -made for purchasing were repaid is enforceable
in equity, although it does not comply with the statute of frauds).
" Ryan v. Dox, supra note 1.
122 JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES OF REAL PROPERTY
(8th ed. 1928) §878.
